Back to School: A Lesson on the Dual Standards for Class Ascertainability by Perera, N. Chethana
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 14
Issue 1 The Pre-Marbury Constitution Article 7
2018
Back to School: A Lesson on the Dual Standards
for Class Ascertainability
N. Chethana Perera
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
N. Chethana Perera, Back to School: A Lesson on the Dual Standards for Class Ascertainability, 14 U. St. Thomas L.J. 249 (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-APR-18 7:08
ARTICLE
BACK TO SCHOOL: A LESSON ON THE
DUAL STANDARDS FOR CLASS
ASCERTAINABILITY
N. CHETHANA PERERA
I. INTRODUCTION: CLASS IS IN SESSION
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) allows fax recipients
to sue for a penalty between $500 and $1,500 for receiving an unsolicited
fax advertisement.1 An employee at Sandusky Wellness Center (Sandusky)
received one such unsolicited fax from Medtox Scientific Incorporated
(Medtox).2 Sandusky proceeded to file a lawsuit against Medtox under the
TCPA.3
As a lone plaintiff, Sandusky would have received a maximum of
$1,500 for the single unsolicited fax it received from Medtox.4 With the
average cost of receiving a one-page fax being under a dollar, a $1,500
reward to the injured fax recipient seems quite adequate.5 Medtox went
even further by offering to pay Sandusky $3,500—well over the statutory
fine Sandusky was entitled to under the TCPA.6 But Sandusky, or perhaps
its lawyers, saw an opportunity to multiply Medtox’s penalty, in Federal
1. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012) (“(B) an action to
recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each
such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the defendant
willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection,
the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more
than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.”).
2. Sandusky Wellness Ctr. LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., No. CIV. 12-2066, 2014 WL
3846037, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2014), rev’d, 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“The statute pro-
vides for a minimum recovery of $500 for each violation as well as treble damages if the plaintiff
can prove willful or knowing violation. This most likely exceeds any actual monetary loss in
paper, ink or lost facsimile time suffered by most plaintiffs in such a case. The statutory remedy is
designed to provide adequate incentive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf.”
(emphasis in original)).
6. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 2014 WL 3846037.
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Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23. Rule 23 allows plaintiffs with similar
injuries to pursue their claims in a class action.7 Thus, Sandusky sought
class certification, a required prerequisite to bring a class action suit.8 The
district court found that the class was not ascertainable, and the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding the class ascertainable.9
Because class actions rarely go to trial,10 the real conflicts in litigation
are centered on class certification.11 The denial of certification sounds the
“death knell” for plaintiffs’ claims, because of the financial impracticability
of bringing individual actions.12 On the other hand, class certification may
coerce defendants into unfair settlements.13 The potentially drastic conse-
quences for parties have encouraged courts to carefully and meaningfully
determine class certification requirements.
In addition to the express requirements of Rule 23,14 courts have read
into the rule an implicit requirement of ascertainability to certify a class.15
Ascertainability is a way to identify and define a proposed class,16 it “goes
to the heart of the question of class certification.”17 For a class to be ascer-
7. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
8. Sandusky Wellness Ctr., 2014 WL 3846037, at *1.
9. Sandusky Wellness Ctr. LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2016).
10. Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Settlements, 20 ANTITRUST
26, 26 (2006) (“Trials in class action cases are quite rare.”).
11. Class certification is described as “preeminently important” for a class action to go for-
ward. Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on
Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 325 (2011). The drafters of Rule 23 also recog-
nized the importance of class certification because they amended Rule 23 to allow interlocutory
appeal of certification decisions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 Amend-
ment, subd. (f) (“An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in
which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an
individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting
certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be
met at low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory
review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.”).
12. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended
(Jan. 16, 2009) (“[D]enying or granting class certification is often the defining moment in class
actions . . . for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs . . . .”).
13. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001), as amended (Oct. 16, 2001)
(“[Class certification may] create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part
of defendants . . . .”).
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
15. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Under Rule
23, certification is proper where the proposed classes satisfy an implicit ascertainability require-
ment. . . .”); see also Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended
(Apr. 28, 2015) (“[T]he ascertainability requirement is implicit rather than explicit in Rule
23 . . . .”).
16. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1760, at 144
(3d ed. 2016) (“[T]he class must not be defined so broadly that it encompasses individuals who
have little connection with the claim being litigated; rather, it must be restricted to individuals
who are raising the same claims or defenses as the representative.”).
17. Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2370 n.69 (2015) (quot-
ing In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 196 F.R.D. 348, 359 (W.D. Wis. 2000)).
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tainable, “the general outlines of the membership of the class [must be]
determinable from the outset of litigation.”18 Yet, federal courts disagree as
to what determines an ascertainable class. Some courts apply a lower stan-
dard for ascertainability, and require the class to be “defined with reference
to objective criteria.”19 These courts focus on objective criteria to define a
class.20 Other courts, applying the heightened standard of ascertainability,
require the proposed class to have a “reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the
class definition.”21 These courts emphasize looking at the plaintiff’s pro-
posed method of identifying class members to make sure it is practical and
feasible.22 Due to the different ascertainability standards, in many cases,
whether a plaintiff’s class action suit will go forward depends on the juris-
diction in which the suit is brought.
This Note discusses the dual standards of ascertainability and recom-
mends that the Supreme Court grant certiorari to apply a uniform standard.
First, the Note discusses the history and purpose of Rule 23.23 Second, the
Note explains the explicit and implicit requirements of Rule 23.24 Third, the
Note examines and evaluates the policy justifications for both as-
certainability standards.25 Finally, the Note concludes by advocating for the
heightened standard for class ascertainability.26
II. HISTORY CLASS: THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF RULE 23
A. Origins Of Rule 23
Representative actions were first used in American courts to adjudicate
the rights of a large group of individuals with a common interest.27 In the
first representative actions, only parties active in the litigation were bound
by the court’s judgment.28 In 1966, the creation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 allowed representative plaintiffs to bind absent class members
18. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 136–137.
19. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2015).
20. Shaw, supra note 17, at 2358 (“Some courts have placed greater emphasis on the objec-
tivity of the class’s definition, which is said to protect against excessive administrative burdens
over the course of the litigation.”).
21. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015)
(citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir.2012)).
22. Shaw, supra note 17, at 2358–2359 (“Other courts have directly scrutinized the adminis-
trative feasibility of identifying individual members, requiring plaintiffs to propose and defend
methods for identifying the class’s membership.”).
23. Infra Part II.
24. Infra Part III.
25. Infra Part IV.
26. Infra Part V.
27. W.G. Watson Jr., Parties: Representative Suits under Federal Rule 23(a)(3), 35 CA. L.
REV. 443, 444–445 (1947) (discussing the history of representative suits in the United States).
28. Id. (discussing how absent parties were not bound by judgments in representative suits
because of res judicata).
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as well.29 This rule created an exception to traditional principles of res judi-
cata—an individual could now be bound by a judgment in litigation she was
not party to.30 Because Rule 23 went against traditional res judicata princi-
ples, courts imposed certain procedural and constitutional requirements on
it.31
While Rule 23 is procedural, it undoubtedly affects parties’ substantive
rights.32 Rule 23 gives the party bringing the class action an incentive to
pursue claims that the party may have otherwise abandoned.33 For example,
X may find it cost prohibitive to bring a $100 claim against Corporation Y,
but Rule 23 allows X to bring a $1,000,000 claim against Corporation Y by
joining with similarly situated plaintiffs. Rule 23 is controversial because it
affects the substantive balance between parties by making litigation easier
for the party bringing the class action.34 Notwithstanding the controversy,
courts and scholars have identified two policy reasons to justify class adju-
dication under Rule 23: (1) the regulatory perspective; and (2) the negative-
value principle.35
B. Rule 23 as a Regulatory Mechanism
Rule 23 was amended in 1966 at the height of the civil rights move-
ment.36 Many civil rights advocates and social justice activists saw Rule 23
as a regulatory mechanism. A member of the 1966 Advisory Committee
amending Rule 23 discussed how civil rights were a major driving force for
revising Rule 23: “If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of the committee,
the energizing force which motivated the whole rule, it was the firm deter-
mination to create a class action system which could deal with civil rights,
29. Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(B)(3) —  the Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L.
REV. 139, 139 (1969).
30. Watson, supra note 27, at 444–445; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)
(“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by
a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has
not been made a party by service of process.” (citations omitted)).
31. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–349 (2011) (“In order to justify a
departure from that rule, a class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.’” (quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977))).
32. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 42 (discussing how class action suits implicate defendants’
due process rights).
33. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015) (“‘[O]nly a lunatic or a
fanatic’ would litigate the claim individually. . . .”) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
34. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D.
299, 299 (1973) (“It makes litigation easier either for plaintiffs or defendants, thereby affecting
the substantive balance between the two.”).
35. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 590, 613 (2013).
36. Lisa Vox, Civil Rights Movement Timeline From 1965 to 1969, THOUGHTCO. (last up-
dated Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.thoughtco.com/civil-rights-movement-timeline-from-1965-to-
1969-45431.
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and explicitly, segregation.”37 The class action device was envisioned as the
“workhorse of institutional reform in civil rights . . . .”38 Rule 23 became a
tool for ending racial segregation in the face of unsuccessful government
action.39
While ending segregation may have been a driving force behind
amending Rule 23, the committee members did not see Rule 23 as solely
benefiting civil rights activists.40 During the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
passionate advocates used class action suits to deinstitutionalize mental
health facilities, to reform prison conditions, to challenge public accommo-
dation laws, and to pursue many other causes.41 Procedural Rule 23 became
a tool to enforce substantive rights that government agencies alone could
not achieve.42 The Supreme Court recognized that class actions suits were a
response to “injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”43
Rule 23 gave plaintiffs the resources to pursue their cases and the large
judgments to deter unlawful behavior.44 Rule 23 also allowed plaintiffs to
attract private lawyers who were otherwise unwilling to take cases involv-
ing low value, individual claims.45 But it is important to note that deter-
37. S. Rep. No. 106-420, at 11 n.6 (2000).
38. Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real Winners? 56 ME. L.
REV. 223, 236 (2004).
39. Id. at 225.
40. For example, committee members also discussed how Rule 23 could effectively apply to
a class of consumers, licensees, and licensors. 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (“Thus an action looking to
specific or declaratory relief could be brought by a numerous class of purchasers, say retailers of a
given description, against a seller alleged to have undertaken to sell to that class at prices higher
than those set for other purchasers, say retailers of another description, when the applicable law
forbids such a pricing differential. So also a patentee of a machine, charged with selling or licens-
ing the machine on condition that purchasers or licensees also purchase or obtain licenses to use
an ancillary unpatented machine, could be sued on a class basis by a numerous group of purchas-
ers or licensees, or by a numerous group of competing sellers or licensors of the unpatented
machine, to test the legality of the ‘tying’ condition.”).
41. Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American
Class Action, 64 EMORY L. J. 399, 402 n.7 (2014) (“See, e.g., Soc’y for the Good Will to Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering better living conditions at
a state institution for mentally handicapped children), vacated, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984);
Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1975) (granting subject to certain
limitations, inter alia, prisoner access to telephones); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687
(E.D.N.Y.) (right of defendants to obtain food meeting dietary requirements), modified, 527 F.2d
492 (2d Cir. 1975); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (ordering an
integration plan for the Mark Twain middle school in Coney Island, Brooklyn), aff’d, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (tolerance for Muslim
prisoners).”).
42. Marcus, supra note 35, at 593 (“Captured or resource-strapped public agencies cannot
adequately enforce the substantive law, requiring a privately-initiated alternative.” (citations
omitted)).
43. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
44. Marcus, supra note 35, at 593.
45. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core
of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action
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rence, rather than the small individual compensation, was the primary
purpose of these suits.46
C. Rule 23 Overcoming Negative Value Suits
A negative expected value suit occurs when a plaintiff’s total litigation
costs exceed the expected judgment.47 Benjamin Kaplan, one of the primary
drafters of the modern version of Rule 23, saw the bundling of plaintiffs
into a “class” as a way to overcome the lack of incentive to pursue a low
value claim.48 Kaplan believed Rule 23 “provide[d] means of vindicating
the rights of people who individually would be without effective strength to
bring their opponents to court at all.”49
Rule 23 made pursuing small value claims financially worthwhile. The
Supreme Court supported this compensatory function of Rule 23 in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin.50 In Eisen, a lone plaintiff’s stake was a mere seventy
dollars.51 The Court explained that “[n]o competent attorney would under-
take this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount.
Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or
not at all.”52 The Court also recognized that Rule 23 allowed plaintiffs to
litigate otherwise negative-value claims without passing on the costs of the
suit to the defendant.53 Eisen exemplifies how Rule 23 allowed plaintiffs to
enforce substantive rights by overcoming financial obstacles to pursue
small recoveries—all without compromising defendants’ rights.54
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”).
46. Marcus, supra note 35, at 593 (citing Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Does it Go Far Enough, 63
A.B.A. J. 837, 842 (1977) (“The primary function of the class action is deterrence of harmful
conduct . . . . Judicial efficiency and compensation of small claimants are merely desirable by-
products.”)).
47. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1059–60 (2003) (“The concept of the negative value claim is most
often applied when the value of the claim is itself is too small to justify the cost of prosecution.”).
48. The 1966 amendment to Rule 23 addressed the lack of economic incentive for an individ-
ual plaintiff to enforce her or his private rights. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
49. Id.
50. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
51. Id. at 157.
52. Id. at 161.
53. Id. at 178–79.
54. Id. Scholars also discuss the benefits of Rule 23 in helping plaintiffs’ low-value cases go
forward without passing on costs to defendants. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV.
356, 390 (1967) (“The object is to get at the cases where a class action promises important advan-
tages of economy and effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of procedural safe-
guards for members of the class or for the opposing party.”).
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III. THE ABCS OF RULE 23: THE EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT
REQUIREMENTS
A. The Explicit Requirements Of Rule 23
Rule 23 has a number of explicit requirements that are necessary to
maintain a class action suit.55 A class must satisfy all of the requirements in
Rule 23(a) and then fit into one of the three categories in Rule 23(b).56
These requirements serve a number of purposes. In light of our judicial
system’s preference for individual litigation, these requirements help safe-
guard absent class members’ rights to pursue litigation and defendants’
rights against inconsistent judgments.57 These requirements also limit the
drain of judicial resources that such a large suit could easily entail by ensur-
ing that a class action is economically and administratively feasible.58 Fail-
ure to satisfy any of Rule 23’s requirements will result in a denial of class
certification.59
First, Rule 23(a)(1) requires numerosity in a class, that is, “the class
[must be] so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”60
Numerosity serves two purposes: (1) it makes sure that the legal system’s
preference for individual litigation is not compromised; and (2) it ensures
that using joinder is unfeasible and that a class action is therefore the most
efficient way to litigate.61 Because the numerosity requirement is policy
based, courts weigh the facts carefully to determine whether numerosity is
met instead of having a strict requirement.62
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b).
56. Id.
57. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402–03 (1980) (“The justifications that
led to the development of the class action include the protection of the defendant from obligations
inconsistent, the protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and eco-
nomical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation
costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.” (citations omitted)).
58. Id.
59. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (denying class certification
because the group of plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)); but see
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (affirming class certification because
plaintiffs met all of Rule 23’s requirements).
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
61. BEVERLY REID O’CONNELL & KAREN L. STEVENSON, RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE:
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, Ch. 10, 10:258 (Rutter Group 2007) (“Individual liti-
gation is preferred where it is possible to join all members’ claims in a single lawsuit. The ‘numer-
osity’ requirement ensures that the class action device is used only where it would be inequitable
and impractical to require every member of the class to be joined individually.”).
62. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)
(“The numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each case and imposes
no absolute limitations.”).
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Second, Rule 23(a)(2) requires commonality in questions of law or
fact to the class.63 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court
stated:
[c]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class
members ‘have suffered the same injury,’ . . . . That common
contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable
of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke.64
Commonality ensures that a common legal question exists for the class, and
thus provides the basis to bind a similarly situated individual to the outcome
of the entire class.65
Third, Rule 23(a)(3) requires typicality: in other words, the claims or
defenses raised by the class representatives should be typical of the claims
or defenses raised by others in the class.66 Courts classify a claim as “‘typi-
cal’ if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that
gives rise to the claims of the other class members, and if her or his claims
are based on the same legal theory.”67 Typicality ensures the representative
is indeed a member of the class, and by pursing her best interests, will also
pursue the best interests of the entire class.68
Fourth, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the representative party will ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.69 This requirement ensures there
are no conflicts of interest between the representative and the rest of the
class.70 Because of the due process concerns of a judgment binding absent
parties, both Rule 23(a)(3) and Rule 23(a)(4) ensure that the representative
will pursue the best interests of the class.71
63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). The disjunctive “or” in this part of the rule shows that the
plaintiffs only need a question of law or fact in common—not both. Id.
64. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349.
65. A group of individuals bringing a class action suit need to show that a court can answer a
question of law or fact that will resolve each individual class member’s litigation. Id.
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
67. Beattie v. CentryTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations
omitted).
68. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 3:28 (5th ed. 2016)
[hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS].
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
70. Conflicts of interest between parties may include class members seeking conflicting rem-
edies, or if some class members benefit from the alleged misconduct. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (class members with existing health problems may prefer a
larger payment immediately while class members waiting to develop health problems may prefer
to keep the fund as large as possible for the future); see also id. (“The adequacy inquiry seeks to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.”).
71. The Constitution demands that absent parties’ interests are protected and pursued if a
judgement is to bind them. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 68, at § 3:51; see also
William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 790, 810 n.79 (2007) (“There is no reason to believe . . . that the concept of adequate
representation present in the rules is anything other than the level of constitutional protection of
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Finally, class members also have to satisfy one of the three prerequi-
sites in Rule 23(b).72 This Note looks only at Rule 23(b)(3)—class actions
for money damages—because ascertainability issues generally arise here.
Rule 23(b)(3) outlines the additional procedural safeguards for class actions
seeking money damages.73 Supplementing Rule 23(a)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) re-
quires common questions of law or fact to the class to predominate over
issues of individual members.74 The rule also requires class adjudication to
be superior to other adjudication methods, and for class adjudication to be
fair and efficient.75
B. The Implicit Requirement Of Rule 23
1. Brief History of the Implied Ascertainability Requirement
The language of Rule 23 has no mention of ascertainability, rather,
ascertainability is a judicially created concept.76 The first mention of as-
certainability was in 1970 with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Debremaecker
v. Short.77 In Debremaecker, a group of plaintiffs protesting the Vietnam
War sought class certification on the basis of being “active in the ‘peace
movement,’” and for being “harassed and intimidated,” or fearing harass-
ment and intimidation.78 The Fifth Circuit asserted that, “[i]t is elementary
that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be represented
must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”79 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit held against class certification, finding that a “peace movement”
was inherently uncertain because of the broad range of activities that could
be lumped under the term.80
Eleven years later, in Simer v. Rios, the Seventh Circuit stressed the
need for a class to be ascertainable.81 In Simer, the Seventh Circuit rejected
a proposed class who was “eligible for CIP assistance but who w[as] denied
assistance or who w[as] discouraged from applying because of the existence
of the invalid regulation . . . .”82 The court emphasized the difficulty—
absent class member interests necessary to deem their virtual participation in litigation fundamen-
tally fair.” (quoting Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 353 (1999))).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
73. Id.; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 341 (2011) (“The Rule’s
history and structure indicate that individualized monetary claims belong instead in Rule 23(b)(3),
with its procedural protections of predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to
opt out.”).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(3).
75. Id.
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
77. J. Cl. DeBremaecker v. Herman Short, 433 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. Id. at 734.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981).
82. Id. at 669.
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indeed the “Sisyphean task”—of identifying a class based on an individ-
ual’s state of mind.83 The Seventh Circuit also discussed the policy justifi-
cations behind requiring an ascertainable class: (1) alerting the court to the
burdens of identifying the class; and (2) ensuring that individuals actually
harmed by the injury form the class.84
Through the 1980s and 1990s, courts treated ascertainability leni-
ently.85 The overwhelming majority of class action suits in federal courts
were securities litigation, where there was generally ample documentation
to identify class members.86 Consumer class actions—where courts now
grapple with ascertaining a class—rarely found their way to federal courts
during this time.87 Thus, the case law from this period gives limited insight
into the requirements of ascertaining a class. But Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on the explicit requirements of Rule 23 give scholars and lower
courts some guidance on the level of rigor required to ascertain a class.88
2. The Supreme Court on Class Certification
The Supreme Court’s stance on class certification seems to fit the
larger trend of increasing the burden on plaintiffs bringing class action
suits. Initially, the Supreme Court implemented a lower standard for class
83. Id.
84. Jamie Zysk Isani & Jason B. Sherry, Ascertainability: Class Action Certification, CLASS
ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), 2 (May 8, 2015). The first justification helps a court make sure that
class adjudication will be an efficient and cost effective. Id. The second adjudication helps “pro-
tect putative class members, who are seeking the relief, and defendants, who benefit from res
judicata when a judgment is entered for or against the class.” Id.
85. Id.
86. Tom Murphy, Implied Class Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit Ascertainability
Requirement in the Wake of Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 57 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 34, 39 n.26 (2016); see
generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (class action claim under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (securities fraud
class action); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (securities fraud class
action); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (securities fraud
class action); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 1990) (securities fraud class
action)).
87. For a federal court to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, it must have federal
question jurisdiction and/or diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2016). Federal
question jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff’s claim arises from federal law or the Constitution.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal question jurisdiction rarely existed because plaintiff consumers did
not have standing to sue under federal laws for claims typical today—like false advertising. See,
e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1178–1179 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs
do not have standing to sue under the Langham Act for false advertising). Diversity jurisdiction,
during this time period, required each plaintiff to meet the minimum amount in controversy. See,
e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 298–99 (1973) (“None of the named plaintiffs and
none of the unnamed members of the class before the Court alleged claims in excess of the requi-
site amount.”). Thus, low value consumer class action suits rarely reached federal courts through
diversity jurisdiction. See Murphy, supra note 86, at 39 n.27.
88. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353 (2011) (requiring plaintiffs
to meet a higher burden of proof to satisfy Rule 23).
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certification in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline.89 But a trilogy of cases after
Eisen evidenced the Court advocating for a heightened standard. This brief
section covers the progression of the Supreme Court’s stance on certifica-
tion rigor.
In Eisen, the Court reprimanded the district court’s decision to deny
class certification by conducting a preliminary investigation into the merits
of the case.90 The Court, in dicta, stated that “nothing in either the language
or history of Rule 23 [ ] gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.”91 Thus, in 1974, the Supreme Court seemed
to instruct lower courts to apply a less rigorous standard during class
certification.92
Less than ten years later, without addressing Eisen, the Supreme Court
began advocating for a more demanding approach to class certification in
General Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon.93 The Court affirmed
the Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s class certification, holding
that courts must “probe behind the pleadings” because the certification pro-
cess “‘generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the [plain-
tiff’s] factual and legal issues. . .’.”94 Indeed, the Court called for a
“rigorous analysis” to ensure a plaintiff complies with Rule 23.95 The Court
also implied that courts should look into the judicial efficiency of adjudicat-
ing a proposed class suit.96 The Court justified its decision to affirm the
Third Circuit because “the maintenance of respondent’s action as a class
action did not advance ‘the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a
principal purpose of the procedure.’”97 The Court re-emphasized that one
of the greatest benefits of the class action tool was to save “the resources of
both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting
every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule
23.”98
In 1997, the Court provided further evidence for a more rigorous stan-
dard for class certification in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.99 In
Amchem, the district court certified a class of people who had been exposed
to asbestos and (1) developed injuries because of their exposure; or (2) who
89. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
90. Id. at 177.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
94. Id. at 160 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978)).
95. Id. at 160–61.
96. See id. at 159 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 155 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
99. See Achem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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may develop injuries because of their exposure.100 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the Third Circuit’s decision to decertify the class and suggested that
plaintiffs need to meet a higher burden of proof to certify a class.101 The
Court noted that the plaintiff’s proposed class did not meet the express re-
quirements of Rule 23.102 Importantly, for our discussion of as-
certainability, the Court noted that the Advisory Committee for Rule 23
“warned district courts to exercise caution when individual stakes are high
and disparities among class members great.”103
In 2014, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court once again re-
quired a higher burden of proof for the plaintiffs to certify a class.104 The
Court overturned the lower court’s class certification because of a failure to
rigorously examine the plaintiff’s proposed class.105 The Court cited Falcon
as requiring “significant proof” demonstrating the relationship between the
plaintiff’s class members and the common injury alleged.106 The Court also
clarified that Eisen’s rejection of merits inquiries was the “purest dictum”
and was “contradicted by [the Supreme Court’s] other cases.”107  While
Dukes dealt with the express requirements of Rule 23, lower courts have
relied on Dukes to enforce a higher standard at the ascertainability stage as
well.108
In sum, while Eisen may have advocated a lower standard for class
certification, the Supreme Court’s stances in Falcon, Amchem, and Dukes
show a trend towards a stricter standard for certification on the explicit
requirements of Rule 23—which may also apply to the implicit requirement
of ascertainability.109
100. Id. at 597
101. Id. at 628.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 594.
104. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353 (2011) (“‘[S]ignificant proof that
an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of
both applicants and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decision making
processes.’ We think that statement precisely describes respondents’ burden in this case.” (quoting
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982))).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 352 n.6.
108. Stephanie Haas, Note, Class is in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Ascertainability
with Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VILL. L. REV. 793, 803 n. 68 (2014) (“See, e.g., Kottaras
v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining D.C. Circuit’s previously
‘low hurdle’ required to show compliance with Rule 23 was no longer an accepted method follow-
ing Wal-Mart); see also M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 838 (5th Cir. 2012)
(vacating class certification order after finding district court failed to conduct rigorous analysis of
commonality required by Wal-Mart).”).
109. See Ashish Prasad, Class Certification after Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 21 PRETRIAL PRAC. &
DISCOVERY 11, 11–13 (2012).
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3. The Class Action Fairness Act’s Effect on Ascertainability
In 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) to
prevent the abuse of the class action device in state courts by pushing con-
sumer class actions into federal courts.110 Congress passed CAFA after
finding, “that abuses of the class action device undermined the national ju-
dicial system, interfered with the free flow of interstate commerce, miscon-
strued the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the Framers, and
enriched counsel at the expense of class members.”111 CAFA was passed to
“create federal court jurisdiction over interstate cases with national impor-
tance, assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate
claims, and benefit the economy.”112
By changing two requirements for class actions, CAFA flung the doors
wide open for small value consumer class actions to enter federal courts.113
First, class actions now only needed minimal diversity; in other words, one
plaintiff had to be diverse from at least one defendant.114 Second, CAFA
increased the amount in controversy requirement from $75,000 to
$5,000,000, but allowed the class members to aggregate their claims to
reach the five million mark.115
As small value consumer class actions increasingly gained federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, federal courts began grappling with how to ascer-
tain these new classes. Unlike the prior securities class actions where
records were ample, small value consumer class actions have few records to
help identify class members.116 Stores and manufacturers do not have
records on the identity of consumers buying their products, or the date and
110. See Nicole Ochi, Note, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litiga-
tion Strategies After CAFA & MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 972 (2008) (“In passing CAFA,
Congress found that abuses of the class action device undermined the national judicial system,
interfered with the free flow of interstate commerce, misconstrued the concept of diversity juris-
diction as intended by the Framers, and enriched counsel at the expense of class members. Con-
gress enacted CAFA to create federal court jurisdiction over interstate cases with national
importance, assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims, and bene-
fit the economy.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Small value consumer class actions decreased in state courts and increased drastically in
federal courts. For example, the number of class actions filed in the state court in Madison
County, Illinois dropped from eighty-two pre-CAFA to a mere sixteen post-CAFA—a drop of
more than ninety percent. John Beisner et al., CAFA Update: The Class Action Jurisdictional
World Clarifies, 2008 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND., 3-1. Meanwhile, in the Ninth Circuit,
class action filings increased by 400% and removals increased by over 100%. Steven S. Gensler,
The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of Class Action Activity in the
Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 809, 835 (2010). Data from the Third, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits also show significant differences in filing and removal rates. Id. at 834.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2016).
115. Id.
116. Isani & Sherry, supra note 84, at 2–3.
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price of these purchases.117 Consumers are even worse at record keeping.
The overwhelming majority of consumers rarely keep receipts for everyday
items like Red Bull drinks and Subway sandwiches that may spawn class
action suits.118 Courts struggled with the level of proof needed to ascertain
a class and whether that proof was required before or after class certifica-
tion.119 Thus, the stage was set for a circuit split on the requirements of
ascertainability for class action certification.
IV. CLASSROOM BRAWL: THE BATTLE OVER A STANDARD FOR
ASCERTAINABILITY
The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits are in the minority in applying
a lower standard for ascertainability.120 These courts hold that an ascertain-
able “class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by ob-
jective criteria . . . .”121 To better explain what this standard entails, the
Seventh Circuit has discussed three concerns plaintiffs should address in
proposing how to ascertain (or identify) a class. First, a proposed class
should avoid vagueness.122 This can be done by “identify[ing] a particular
group harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular location, in a
particular way.”123 Second, a proposed class should not be defined by sub-
jective criteria. Such criteria, like a proposed class member’s state of mind,
will fail.124 But objective criteria, like the defendant’s conduct, will pass the
test.125 Third, a party proposing a class should steer clear of “fail-safe clas-
ses”—a class that only includes members whose claims would be success-
ful on the merits.126 Whether a class member belongs in the class should
“not depend on the liability of the defendant.”127
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits are in the ma-
jority in applying a heightened standard for ascertainability.128 In addition
to a class being defined by objective criteria, these circuits also require “a
117. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting the manufac-
turer had no records of consumers who bought its products).
118. See id. (“[T]here is no dispute that class members are unlikely to have documentary proof
of purchase, such as packaging or receipts.”).
119. Isani & Sherry, supra note 84, at 2–3.
120. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr. v. Medtox Sc., Inc., 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016);
Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 2015); Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012).
121. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657.
122. Id. at 659–660.
123. Id. at 660.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660.
128. See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2015); Karhu v. Vital
Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 945 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9
(1st Cir. 2015); EQT Products Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014); Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
727 F.3d 300, 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
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reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether
putative class members fall within the class definition.”129 The method pro-
posed for identifying class members must be “manageable” and require lit-
tle, if any, individualized fact finding.130 Courts applying this standard look
carefully at the records suggested to ascertain a class to make sure they do
in fact identify the class members and the injury the class members allege in
common.131
The Seventh Circuit has given an in-depth analysis of the lower as-
certainability standard the Sixth and Eighth Circuits apply.132 In return, the
Third Circuit has comprehensively analyzed the heightened standard that
the First, Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits apply.133 Both sides of the
divide have identified four policy concerns underpinning their respective
standards: (1) judicial efficiency; (2) unfairness to absent class members;
(3) unfairness to bona fide class members; and (4) the protection of defend-
ants’ due process rights.134 This section examines and evaluates these pol-
icy concerns.
A. Judicial Efficiency
The first policy consideration courts look at when deciding to apply
the lower or heightened standard is judicial efficiency.135 Administrative
convenience, judicial efficiency, and administrative efficiency are used in-
terchangeably by courts when discussing the time and resources involved
with class actions.136 For uniformity, this Note uses judicial efficiency to
refer to all of these terms.
129. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015)
(citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir.2012)).
130. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307–08 (quoting NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 68, at
§ 3:3)).
131. See, e.g., id. at 310–12 (finding the plaintiff’s proposed class unascertainable because the
plaintiff’s proposed methods of affidavit identification would require a series of mini-hearings).
132. Sandusky Wellness Ctr. v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining the Seventh Circuit’s approach to ascertainability).
133. Id. (explaining the Third Circuit’s approach to ascertainability).
134. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 663–73 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining the
Seventh Circuit’s view of ascertainability in context of the four policy considerations).
135. See, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (“If a class cannot be ascertained in an economical
and ‘administratively feasible’ manner, significant benefits of a class action are lost.” (quoting
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations
omitted))).
136. Compare Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305 (“[The heightened ascertainability standard] elimi-
nates serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class
action by insisting on the easy identification of class members.” (emphasis added)), with Mullins,
795 F.3d at 663 (“This concern about administrative inconvenience is better addressed by the
explicit requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized judicial efficiency as a crucial
concern when certifying a class for the express requirements of Rule 23.137
Indeed, judicial efficiency is an important consideration in a system “where
judges and facilities are in short supply . . . .”138 In many cases, adjudicat-
ing class actions is more efficient than adjudicating individual claims.139
But, class actions still use a significant amount of judicial resources, espe-
cially money and time—trials can cost millions and last months. Thus,
courts carefully consider judicial efficiency when deciding whether to cer-
tify a class and proceed with a class action suit. In fact, circuit courts have
addressed judicial efficiency more than any other policy factor when decid-
ing which standard to apply.140 This section examines both sides of the
debate on judicial efficiency and class ascertainability, and then concludes
that the heightened ascertainability standard better serves this policy
rationale.
1. Heightened Ascertainability Standard
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have all voiced
concerns with the lower standard of ascertainability on the grounds of judi-
cial efficiency.141 The Third Circuit was the most vocal proponent of this
concern when it implemented a heightened ascertainability standard in Car-
rera v. Bayer Corp.142 In Carrera, the plaintiff sought certification for a
class that bought a deceptively advertised diet pill.143 The Third Circuit
asserted that, in addition to the objective criteria used to identify a class,
there must also be an “administratively feasible” way of ascertaining a pro-
posed class.144 The court denied certification, in part, because the plaintiff’s
proposed method of affidavits would require a series of mini trials to iden-
tify the class—a method the Carrera court believed was unmanageable.145
137. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 291, 618 (1997) (“The development [of
class action certification jurisprudence] reflects concerns about the efficient use of court
resources . . . .”).
138. Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47,  48 (1975).
139. Id.
140. Compare Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (“If a class cannot be ascertained in an economical
and ‘administratively feasible’ manner, significant benefits of a class action are lost (citations
omitted)), with Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (“Imposing a stringent version of ascertainability because
of concerns about administrative inconvenience renders the manageability criterion of the superi-
ority requirement superfluous.” (citing Daniels Luks, Note, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit:
Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2395 (2014))).
141. See Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2015); Karhu v. Vital Pharm.,
Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 945 (11th Cir. 2015); EQT Products Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir.
2014); Carrera, 727 F.3d at 300.
142. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 300.
143. Id. at 304.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 307–08 (“The method of determining whether someone is in the class must be
‘administratively feasible . . . . [A] plaintiff does not satisfy the ascertainability requirement if
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In contrast to the courts that advocate for a lower standard to keep true to
the purpose of class action suits,146 the Carrera court explained that “[i]f a
class cannot be ascertained in an economical and ‘administratively feasible
manner,’ significant benefits of a class action are lost.”147
In EQT Products Co. v. Adair, the Fourth Circuit considered identify-
ing members of the plaintiff’s proposed class by looking at title docu-
ments.148 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to certify
the class because of its concerns over judicial efficiency.149 The court as-
serted that the plaintiff’s method of certification involved “complications
pos[ing] a significant administrative barrier to ascertaining the ownership
classes.”150 These complications included “numerous heirship, intestacy,
and title-defect issues plagu[ing] many of the potential class members’
claims to the gas estate.”151 The Fourth Circuit stated that a court should
give significant consideration to the administrative manageability of identi-
fying injured plaintiffs before concluding that a class is ascertainable.152
(emphasis added)
individualized fact-finding or mini-trials will be required to prove class membership . . . . Admin-
istrative feasibility means that identifying class members is a manageable process that does not
require much, if any, individual factual inquiry.’” (citing NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra
note 68, at § 3:3)); see also Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Class mem-
bership must be readily identifiable such that a court can determine who is in the class and bound
by its ruling without engaging in numerous fact-intensive inquiries.”).
146. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Imposing a
stringent version of ascertainability because of concerns about administrative inconvenience ren-
ders the manageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous.” (citing Luks, supra
note 140, at 2395)).
147. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citation omitted). One of the benefits the Third Circuit dis-
cusses is to save “‘the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue poten-
tially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.’” Id.
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
148. See EQT Products v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing how the court
can look at various ownership schedules).
149. Id. at 358 (“After reviewing the magistrate judge’s R & R and the district court’s certifi-
cation orders, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in at least two ways. First, it
failed to rigorously analyze whether the administrative burden of identifying class members in the
ownership cases would render class proceedings too onerous.”)
150. Id. at 359.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 359–360 (“The fact that verifying ownership will be necessary for the class mem-
bers to receive royalties does not mean it is not also a prerequisite to identifying the class. Without
even a rough estimate of the number of potential successors-in-interest, we have little conception
of the nature of the proposed classes or who may be bound by a potential merits ruling. Lacking
even a rough outline of the classes’ size and composition, we cannot conclude that they are suffi-
ciently ascertainable. On remand, the district court should reconsider the ascertainability issues
posed by the ownership classes. At a minimum, the district court should endeavor to determine the
number of potential class members who have obtained their interest in the gas estate after the
defendants first prepared the ownership schedules. The court should also give greater considera-
tion to the administrative challenges it will face when using land records to determine current
ownership, and assess whether any trial management tools are available to ease this process. The
district court should also determine whether it is possible to adjust the class definitions to avoid or
mitigate the administrative challenges we have identified.”).
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The Second Circuit also clarified, “that the touchstone of as-
certainability is whether the class is ‘sufficiently definite so that it is admin-
istratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual
is a member.’”153 In Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court’s certification of a proposed class of bondholders
suing Argentina for defaulted bonds.154 The Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff’s objective standard of owning an interest in a bond—with no limi-
tation, like a time period—was insufficiently definite to ascertain the
class.155 The court discussed how the lack of any limitation to identify par-
ticular bondholders would require mini-hearings to determine the class.156
In fact, the Second Circuit went on to compare the proposed class to a class
of people wearing blue shirts.157
A class defined as ‘those wearing blue shirts,’ while objective,
could hardly be called sufficiently definite and readily identifi-
able; it has no limitation on time or context, and the ever-chang-
ing composition of the membership would make determining the
identity of those wearing blue shirts impossible. In short, the use
of objective criteria cannot alone determine ascertainability when
those criteria, taken together, do not establish the definite bounda-
ries of a readily identifiable class.158
2. Lower Ascertainability Standard
Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have expressed concern over
adopting the heightened ascertainability standard based on the justification
of judicial efficiency.159 The Eighth Circuit has also voiced its concern that
the heightened ascertainability standard “gives one factor in the balance ab-
solute priority, with the effect of barring class actions where class treatment
153. Brecher v. Republic of Arg., 806 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2015).
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 25.
156. Id. at 26 (“A hypothetical illustrates this problem. Two bondholders—A and B—each
hold beneficial interests in $50,000 of bonds. A opts out of the class, while B remains in the class.
Following a grant of summary judgment on liability, both A and B then sell their interests on the
secondary market to a third party, C. C now holds a beneficial interest in $100,000 of bonds, half
inside the class and half outside the class. If C then sells a beneficial interest in $25,000 of bonds
to a fourth party, D, the absence of a temporal limitation like the continuous holder requirement
ensures that neither the purchaser nor the court can ascertain whether D ‘s beneficial interest falls
inside or outside of the class.”).
157. Id. at 25.
158. Id.
159. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Imposing a stringent ver-
sion of ascertainability because of concerns about administrative inconvenience renders the man-
ageability criterion of the superiority requirement superfluous.” (citing Luks, supra note 140, at
2395)); see also Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2012) (“It is
often the case that class action litigation grows out of systemic failures of administration, policy
application, or records management that result in small monetary losses to large numbers of peo-
ple. To allow that same systemic failure to defeat class certification would undermine the very
purpose of class action remedies.”).
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is often most needed: in cases involving relatively low-cost goods or ser-
vices, where consumers are unlikely to have documentary proof of
purchase.”160
The Seventh Circuit has explained in detail its justification for apply-
ing the lower standard of ascertainability.161 In Mullins v. Direct Digital,
the court recognized that the proposed class members could not be identi-
fied at the outset of the litigation.162 Yet, the Seventh Circuit insisted on
applying the lower ascertainability standard.163
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Rule 23(b)(3) already requires that
the class device be “superior to other available methods for fairly and effi-
ciently adjudicating the controversy.”164 The court reasoned that Rule
23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement requires a judge to consider alterna-
tives.165 These alternative methods include: decertifying a class at a later
stage, insisting on the plaintiff’s strategy for notifying and managing the
class, and appointing a special master.166 The court explained that the lower
ascertainability requirement gives judges appropriate discretion167 to decide
whether a class is indeed unwieldy at the best point in the litigation—in-
stead of going against “the well-settled presumption that courts should not
refuse to certify a class merely on the basis of manageability concerns.”168
The court also discussed how the heightened ascertainability require-
ment encouraged judges to “look at the problem in a vacuum” and only
consider the costs of a class action suit.169 Instead, the Seventh Circuit ad-
vocated for courts to weigh the “costs and benefits” of the class device.170
The court encouraged considering whether, “‘judicial management of a
class action . . . will reap the rewards of efficiency and economy for the
entire system that the drafters of the federal rule envisioned . . . .’”171 The
Seventh Circuit feared that courts would use the heightened standard “to
erect a nearly insurmountable hurdle at the class certification stage in situa-
160. Sandusky Wellness Ctr. v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658).
161. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663–673 (explaining its justifications for applying the lower
standard).
162. Id. at 661 (“Direct Digital asserts that the only method of identifying class members here
is by affidavits from the putative class members themselves. That remains to be seen. We do not
know yet what sales and customer records Direct Digital has. We assume for purposes of this
decision that Direct Digital will have no records for a large number of retail customers. We also
assume that many consumers of Instaflex are unlikely to have kept their receipts since it’s a
relatively inexpensive consumer good.”).
163. Id. at 658.
164. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
165. Id. at 664.
166. Id.
167. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664.
168. Id. at 663.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 664 (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at § 1780).
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tions where a class action is the only viable way to pursue valid but small
individual claims.”172
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit expressed concerns over judicial effi-
ciency’s potential to keep out the very kind of class actions Rule 23 is
meant to encompass. In Young v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the
Sixth Circuit’s leading class action case, the court affirmed the district
court’s decision to allow class certification173—despite the need to manu-
ally review hundreds of files.174 The Sixth Circuit believed that denying
class certification because of concerns over judicial efficiency would allow
defendants to “escape class-wide review due solely to the size of their busi-
ness or the manner in which their business records were maintained.”175
The court further stated:
It is often the case that class action litigation grows out of sys-
temic failures of administration, policy application, or records
management that result in small monetary losses to large numbers
of people. To allow that same systemic failure to defeat class cer-
tification would undermine the very purpose of class action
remedies.176
B. Unfairness To Absent Class Members
The second consideration that courts look at when deciding to apply
the lower or heightened standard is unfairness to class members.177 Absent
class members are part of the certified class, but are not actively involved in
the litigation.178 Because these class members are “absent” (and not directly
involved) they have little control over the selection of counsel, and have no
say in the type or structure of the recovery.179 These absent class members
172. Id. at 662.
173. Young v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Rikos v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (“In our circuit, the ascertainability
inquiry is guided by Young, 693 F.3d 532.”).
174. Young, 693 F.3d at 540 (“[T]he need to manually review files is not dispositive.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–306 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Second, [the height-
ened ascertainability standard] protects absent class members by facilitating the best notice practi-
cable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. Third, it protects defendants by ensuring that
those persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly identifiable.”).
178. CLASS ACTION LITIG. INFO., http://www.classactionlitigation.com/glossary.html (“Absent
Class Member[:] A person who by the class definition is a class member but is not actually named
in the complaint and does not generally actively participate in the litigation.”) (last visited Oct. 6,
2016).
179. Steven T. O. Cottreau, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 480, 487 (1998) (“[C]lass members have little control over the selection of class counsel and
even less control over counsel’s conduct after selection . . . class members [also] cannot choose
the structure of relief offered as part of a settlement agreement. Some may prefer injunctive relief,
others monetary damages, and yet others an in-kind benefit. Individual actions allow each class
member to negotiate a settlement that offers the greatest utility.”).
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rely on the named plaintiff to adequately represent their interests.180 Absent
class members should receive some type of notice so they can opt out of the
class if they do not think they are adequately represented.181 If absent class
members do not opt out, they are bound by the judgment and cannot bring
their own suit.182 The different standards of ascertainability have different
standards for what is required at certification to identify all the absent class
members, and what type of notice is required for these members.183 This
section examines what each side says on unfairness to absent class members
in the context of class ascertainability, and then discusses why the height-
ened standard better protects these members.
1. Heightened Standard of Ascertainability
Only the Third Circuit has explained how the heightened standard of
ascertainability protects absent class members.184 The Carrera court dis-
cussed how enforcing the heightened standard “protects absent class mem-
bers by facilitating the best notice practicable under Rule 23 . . . .”185 Rule
23(b)(3) requires class members to be provided with notice of a pending
class action,186 and Rule 23(c)(2)(B) specifies that any class certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) requires the “best notice that is practicable under the circum-
stances.”187 The best practicable notice rule allows class members to avoid
being bound by the certified class’ final decision if they want to litigate
180. Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class
Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 925 (2010) (“[A]bsent class members, relying
on the promise that their interests will be protected, may choose not to participate in the class
suit . . . .”).
181. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at § 1765 (3d ed. 2016) (“In many contexts, notice of the
action is the touchstone that satisfies due process; the notice must be sufficient to give the party an
opportunity to appear and join in the lawsuit or to challenge the claims of representation.  Indeed,
it has been suggested that adequate representation may not be constitutionally required if suffi-
cient notice is provided.”).
182. Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions and Options for
Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 894 (2005) (“[I]nclusion in the class is binding on that
party . . . .”); see also Cottreau, supra note 179, at 481 (“[I]f the court enters judgment, the class
will be bound and no members of the class will have the right to bring individual actions.”).
183. Compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–306 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Second, [the
heightened ascertainability standard] protects absent class members by facilitating the best notice
practicable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. Third, it protects defendants by ensuring
that those persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly identifiable.”) with Mullins
v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015) (“For Rule 23(b)(3) classes, Rule 23(c)(2)(B)
requires the ‘best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.’ The rule does not insist on actual
notice to all class members in all cases. It recognizes it might be impossible to identify some class
members for purposes of actual notice.” (quoting Shaw, supra note 17, at 67–69)).
184. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305–06 (“Second, [the heightened standard] protects absent class
members by facilitating the best notice practicable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3)
action.”).
185. Id.
186. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 22 11-APR-18 7:08
270 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
their claims individually.188 The Third Circuit advocated that the best way
to ensure that absent class members receive the best practicable notice was
to require plaintiffs to propose some method to identify all class members at
the certification stage.189
2. Lower Standard of Ascertainability
Only the Seventh Circuit has addressed unfairness to absent class
members in the context of ascertainability.190 The Mullins court asserted
that Rule 23 “does not insist on actual notice to all class members”191 be-
cause such notice might be impossible in some cases.192 Instead, the court
thought a notice plan need only be “‘commensurate with the stakes.’”193
The Seventh Circuit also thought that courts could consider the likelihood
of someone using her opt-out right194—and then went on to say that, “‘only
a lunatic or a fanatic’ would litigate the claim individually.”195 Thus, the
lower the individual claim, the less a court can require from a notice
plan.196 Mullins discussed how the heightened ascertainability standard
“upsets this balance” because “insisting on actual notice to protect the inter-
ests of absent class members, yet overlooks the reality that without certifi-
cation, putative class members with valid claims would not recover
anything at all.”197 The Seventh Circuit feared that the requirement of ac-
tual notice would create a bar too high for most low-value consumer class
action suits.198
188. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, at § 1786 (3d ed. 2016) (“Without the notice requirement
it would be constitutionally impermissible to give the judgment binding effect against the absent
class members. The notice serves to inform absentees who otherwise might not be aware of the
proceeding that their rights are in litigation so that they can take whatever steps they deem appro-
priate to make certain that their interests are protected. In this way, it guarantees each class mem-
ber an opportunity to have a day in court or, at least, to oversee the conduct of the action by the
representatives.”).
189. Id.
190. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 665–667 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing unfairness
to absent class members).
191. Id. at 665.
192. Id. (“[The Rule] recognizes it might be impossible to identify some class members for
purposes of actual notice. While actual individual notice may be the ideal, due process does not
always require it.” (citations omitted)).
193. Id. at 666 (citing Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 665 (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.2004)).
196. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665.
197. Id. at 666.
198. Id. (“When it comes to protecting the interests of absent class members, courts should not
let the perfect become the enemy of the good.”).
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C. Unfairness To Bona Fide Class Members
The third concern courts consider when deciding whether to apply the
heightened or lower standard is unfairness to bona fide class members.199 A
bona fide class member is one who makes a claim to the damages award in
good faith, without fraud or deceit.200 Some courts reason that the height-
ened standard helps screen out fraudulent class members who may decrease
the recovery of a bona fide class member.201 Alternatively, other courts
enforce the lower ascertainability standard—rejecting the premise that false
class members unfairly receive a share of recovery and asserting that the
heightened standard actually deprives bona fide class members of any re-
covery.202 This section takes an in-depth look at the discussion on both
sides, and explains why the heightened standard is more fair to bona fide
class members.
1. Heightened Standard
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have justified the heightened standard
of ascertainability because of unfairness to bona fide class members. But
each of these circuits took a slightly different approach in determining how
many fraudulent parties can be included.
To take away the chance of fraudulent claims diluting a legitimate
class member’s recovery, the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to present a
model showing how a court can reliably screen affidavits for accuracy.203 In
Carrera, the court rejected the plaintiff’s model to screen affidavits because
the plaintiff did not propose a model specific to the case.204 The plaintiff
proposed a model that distributed payment to a settlement class—even
though the standards for approving a settlement class and certifying a litiga-
tion class are different.205 The court also rejected the plaintiff’s model be-
cause plaintiff did not establish the reliability of the model.206 Indeed, the
199. See e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is unfair to absent
class members if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or
inaccurate claims.”).
200. Bona Fide, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining bona fide as “[i]n or
with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud.”).
201. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310 (“It is unfair to absent class members if there is a signifi-
cant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”).
202. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663–69 (rejecting the Third Circuit’s justification of unfairness
to bona fide class members to justify the heightened ascertainability standard).
203. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310–11 (3d Cir. 2013).
204. Id. at 311.
205. Id.
206. Id. (“At this stage in the litigation, the district court will not actually see the model in
action. Rather, it will just be told how the model will operate with the plaintiff’s assurances it will
be effective. Such assurances that a party ‘intends or plans to meet the requirements’ are insuffi-
cient to satisfy Rule 23.”).
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court explained how the number of fraudulent claims could range between
five and fifty percent under the plaintiff’s suggested model.207
Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit applies a slightly broader standard by
requiring a plaintiff, seeking class certification by affidavits, to propose
some way to screen out fraudulent claims.208 In Karhu, the plaintiff had not
proposed any model to screen out false affidavits. The court required the
plaintiff to submit “a specific proposal as to how identification via affidavit
would successfully operate.”209 It is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit
would go further and also require a plaintiff to establish a model’s reliabil-
ity—as the Third Circuit did in Carrera.210
2. Lower Standard
Only the Seventh Circuit has addressed this concern—but it has done
so in detail.211 The Mullins court found two problems with courts relying on
unfairness to bona fide class members to justify a heightened standard.212
First, the court did not think that there was a significant enough risk of
fraudulent claims to dilute the recovery of bona fide class members.213 The
court explained that there is no empirical evidence to support recovery dilu-
tion.214  The court also thought the value of each class member’s recovery
seemed too low for a person to risk perjury by signing a false affidavit.215
The court acknowledged that there is some risk of fraud, and that theoreti-
cally fraudulent class claimants could claim more than legitimate class
claimants.216 But the court said that in reality, claim rates for class actions
are generally between five and fifteen percent—meaning that even a large
number of fraud claims would not reduce a legitimate class member’s re-
207. Id. (“Carrera has suggested no way to determine the reliability of such a model. For
example, even if a model screens out a significant number of claims, say 25%, there is probably
no way to know if the true number of fraudulent or inaccurate claims was actually 5% or 50%.”).
208. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff propos-
ing ascertainment via self-identification, then, must establish how the self-identification method
proposed will avoid the potential problems just described.”).
209. Id.
210. This is not clear because the plaintiff did not submit a model to test proposed class
members’ affidavits for fraudulent claims. If such a model was submitted, the Eleventh Circuit
may have determined that a mere proposal was enough to pass muster at the certification stage.
Alternatively, the court may have determined—like the Third Circuit—that a plaintiff establish
the reliability of a proposed screening method.
211. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310 (“It is unfair to absent class members if there is a signifi-
cant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”).
212. Id.
213. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he risk of dilution based
on fraudulent or mistaken claims seems low, perhaps to the point of being negligible.”).
214. Id. (“In this case, for example, the value of each claim is approximately $70 (the retail
price). Direct Digital has provided no evidence, and we have found none, that claims of this
magnitude have provoked the widespread submission of inaccurate or fraudulent claims.”).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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covery.217 Regardless, the Seventh Circuit thought courts have ample tools
to combat fraudulent claims.218 These include auditing processes, follow up
notices, and empirical means to measure the likelihood of fraud.219
Second, the court thought that denying class certification because of a
“fear of dilution” would bar deserving class members from any recovery.220
The court asserted that “by ‘focusing on making absolutely certain that
compensation is distributed only to those individuals who were actually
harmed,’ the heightened ascertainability requirement ‘has ignored an
equally important policy objective of class actions: deterring and punishing
corporate wrongdoing.’”221
The Mullins court also challenged the heightened ascertainability stan-
dard’s treatment of plaintiff affidavits.222 The court acknowledged that
plaintiffs have the burden to satisfy Rule 23, but believed that affidavits
amply met these requirements.223 The court claimed that there was no legal
basis to deny self-serving affidavits—they are used in other legal circum-
stances, like motions for summary judgment, and there is always fair oppor-
tunity for the opposing party to challenge them.224 The Seventh Circuit
claimed that district court judges have ample discretion to devise ways to
screen these affidavits if needed.225
D. Protecting Defendants’ Due Process Rights
The Supreme Court has recognized that the requirements of Rule 23
are “grounded in due process.”226 Thus, the fourth and final concern courts
look at when deciding whether to apply the heightened or lower standard of
ascertainability is a defendant’s due process rights.227 In the context of class
217. Id.
218. Id. at 667–68.
219. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667–68.
220. Id. at 668.
221. Id. (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175–176 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr.
28, 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring)).
222. Id. at 668–69.
223. Id. (“Why are affidavits from putative class members deemed insufficient as a matter of
law to satisfy this burden? In other words, no one disputes that the plaintiff carries the burden; the
decisive question is whether certain evidence is sufficient to meet it.” (emphasis in original)).
224. Id. at 669 (“If not disputed, self-serving affidavits can support a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, for example, and defendants surely will be entitled to a fair opportunity to
challenge self-serving affidavits from plaintiffs. We are aware of only one type of case in Ameri-
can law where the testimony of one witness is legally insufficient to prove a fact. See U.S. Const.,
Art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (‘No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two wit-
nesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.’). There is no good reason to extend
that rule to consumer class actions.”).
225. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669 (“Given the significant harm caused by immunizing corporate
misconduct, we believe a district judge has discretion to allow class members to identify them-
selves with their own testimony and to establish mechanisms to test those affidavits as needed.”).
226. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008).
227. Compare Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672 (“[T]he concern about protecting a defendant’s due
process rights does not justify the heightened ascertainability requirement. In all cases, the defen-
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ascertainability, courts discuss two rights that defendants have. First, is the
right protected by the doctrine of res judicata: a defendant’s right to be
protected from litigation on an issue that has already been fully litigated.228
This is a concern for class actions suits because dissatisfied class members
can claim that the named plaintiff did not adequately represent them.229 If
these dissatisfied members establish inadequate representation in court, they
can sue the defendant again.230 Second, is the right for a defendant to fully
defend against a claim.231 While this is a well-established due process right
for individual actions, this right takes on new complexity in a class action
where there may be hundreds, thousands, or even millions of members us-
ing unsupported affidavits to claim an injury.232 This section considers how
both sides view defendants’ due process rights, and then explains how the
heightened standard better protects these rights.
1. Heightened Ascertainability Standard
The Third and Eleventh Circuits have been the most vocal in regard to
defendants’ due process rights. In Carrera, the Third Circuit warned that
dant has a right not to pay in excess of its liability and to present individual defenses, but both
rights are protected by other features of the class device and ordinary civil procedure.”) with
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir.2012) (“Forcing BMW and Bridge-
stone to accept as true absent persons’ declarations that they are members of the class, without
further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process implications.”).
228. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 926 (2016) (“Broadly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata treats
the final determination of an action as speaking the infallible truth as to the rights of the parties as
to the entire subject of the controversy, so that such controversy and every part of it must stand
irrevocably closed by such determination. The sum and substance of the whole doctrine is that a
matter once judicially decided is finally decided.”).
229. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455 (2d ed.
2016) (“There must in fact be adequate representation. Absent class members do not have a duty
to intervene to protect themselves; instead, they can remain aloof, relying initially on the duty of
the court to ensure adequate representation and ultimately on the opportunity to mount a collateral
attack for inadequate representation.”).
230. Id.
231. Mark Moller, Class Action Defendants’ New Lochnerism, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 319, 319
(2012) (“In civil proceedings, due process guarantees defendants a right to mount a full defense
based on presentation of any probative ‘rebuttal evidence’ that they ‘choose.’”).
232. Id. at 319–320 (“When defendants want to rely on individualized evidence—that is, evi-
dence unique to individual claims—it’s simply impossible to lump together large numbers of
those claims into a class action and, at the same time, respect defendant’s rights to present that
evidence. Take an employment discrimination suit alleging that a very large class of employees
was denied promotions because of its members’ gender. After investigating the unique features of
each class member’s employment history, defendants might find evidence that a number of class
members were refused promotions because they were bad employees, not because they were wo-
men. And if just one of these women had sued the defendant, the defendant would certainly be
allowed to develop that evidence. Yet, if the class is very large—compromising, say, hundreds of
thousands, or even millions, of women—providing defendants the opportunity to rebut each claim
based on particularized evidence would be utterly infeasible. Hundreds of thousands of minihear-
ings, after all, could take years or even decades to complete.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 27 11-APR-18 7:08
2018] DUAL STANDARDS FOR CLASS ASCERTAINABILITY 275
taking a plaintiff’s “say so”233 on a method to ascertain a class, such as self-
identifying affidavits, “would have serious due process implications.”234
The Eleventh Circuit also acknowledged that accepting affidavits, without
any verification method, would essentially deprive a defendant of her or his
ability to individually challenge claims.235 Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit
discussed how protecting the defendants’ due process rights by allowing
them to challenge any and every self-identifying affidavit would be “admin-
istratively infeasible.”236 The heightened standard requires a plaintiff to go
beyond mere assertions of a method to identify a class. The plaintiff must
also “establish that the records are in fact useful for identification purposes
and that identification will be administratively feasible.”237
The Third Circuit further explained how a lower standard might sub-
ject a defendant to multiple suits.238 The court discussed how legitimate
class members, whose recoveries were materially reduced by fraudulent
claims, could bring another suit against the defendant claiming that the
named plaintiff did not adequately represent them.239 Even more alarming,
if a class action won its suit, these dissatisfied class members could “apply
the principles of issue preclusion to prevent [a defendant] from re-litigating
whether it is liable . . . .”240
2. Lower Ascertainability Standard
Once again, of the three circuits applying the lower ascertainability
standard, only the Seventh Circuit has addressed ascertainability in context
of defendants’ due process rights.241 The Mullins court acknowledged that,
“a defendant has a due process right not to pay in excess of its liability and
to present individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability.”242
But the court went on to say that “[i]t does not follow that a defendant has a
233. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Marcus v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir.2012)).
234. Id. at 306 (citing Marcus, 687 F.3d at 583).
235. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015) (“On the one hand,
allowing class members to self-identify without affording defendants the opportunity to challenge
class membership ‘provide[s] inadequate procedural protection to . . . [d]efendant[s]’ and ‘impli-
cate[s their] due process rights.’” (quoting Perez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262, 269
(S.D. Fla. 2003))).
236. Id. at 949; see also id. at 948–49 (“On the other hand, protecting defendants’ due-process
rights by allowing them to challenge each claimant’s class membership is administratively infeasi-
ble, because it requires a ‘series of mini-trials just to evaluate the threshold issue of which [per-
sons] are class members.’” (quoting Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 302
(S.D. Ala. 2006))).
237. Id. at 948.
238. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013).
239. Id.
240. Id. (“When class members are not adequately represented by the named plaintiff, they are
not bound by the judgment.” (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940)).
241. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 669–672 (7th Cir. 2015).
242. Id. at 669.
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due process right to a cost-effective procedure for challenging every indi-
vidual claim to class membership.”243
The court gave three examples of class actions suits to show why the
heightened standard “is not the only means, or even the best means, to pro-
tect the defendant’s due process rights.”244 The first model used aggregate
damage models where adding or subtracting class members does not affect
a defendant’s liability or damages—and thus does not implicate a defen-
dant’s due process rights.245 The second model, which fits most consumer
class actions, was a common method to determine individual damages.246
The third model was individualized damage determinations without a com-
mon method (like a calculation applied to different sets of class mem-
bers).247 The court did not think the second and third models implicated any
due process rights since a defendant has the opportunity to individually
challenge each claim.248
In addressing the concern of protecting a defendant’s due process
rights, the Mullins court reiterated its discussion of using self-identifying
affidavits. The Mullins court claimed that self-identifying affidavits, which
are used in other court proceedings, were ample to satisfy Rule 23.249 The
court also emphasized that district court judges’ ability to screen the affida-
vits alleviated any concerns about using them.250
E. Resolving the Dispute
1. Judicial Efficiency
Some courts are concerned that applying the higher ascertainability
standard for judicial efficiency purposes will eliminate consumer class ac-
tion suits. These courts are not entirely unjustified in thinking this—indeed,
many courts that apply the heightened standard of ascertainability have de-
243. Id.
244. Id. at 671.
245. Id. at 670.
246. Id. at 670–71.
247. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671–672.
248. Id.
249. Id. (“Why are affidavits from putative class members deemed insufficient as a matter of
law to satisfy this burden? In other words, no one disputes that the plaintiff carries the burden; the
decisive question is whether certain evidence is sufficient to meet it.” (emphasis in original)); see
also id. at 669 (“If not disputed, self-serving affidavits can support a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, for example, and defendants surely will be entitled to a fair opportunity to
challenge self-serving affidavits from plaintiffs. We are aware of only one type of case in Ameri-
can law where the testimony of one witness is legally insufficient to prove a fact. See U.S. Const.,
Art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (‘No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two wit-
nesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.’). There is no good reason to extend
that rule to consumer class actions.”).
250. Id. at 669 (“Given the significant harm caused by immunizing corporate misconduct, we
believe a district judge has discretion to allow class members to identify themselves with their
own testimony and to establish mechanisms to test those affidavits as needed.”).
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nied certification for certain suits because they are not judicially effi-
cient.251 But these courts are not denying all small claims consumer class
action suits. The First Circuit affirmed the certification of a class suit be-
cause an administratively feasible mechanism was identified,252 and the
Eleventh Circuit gave suggestions on what could constitute such a mecha-
nism.253 These cases, and others, show that small claims consumer class
actions may proceed—and indeed may thrive—under a heightened as-
certainability standard, as long as the plaintiff identifies a way to ascertain
its class in a manageable manner.254
The First Circuit used administrative concerns to affirm certification of
a class action suit. In In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation,255 the district court
certified a class of individual consumers of a heartburn drug that AstraZen-
ica produces.256 On appeal, the defendants argued for overturning class cer-
tification because the plaintiffs’ method of ascertaining the class would
require differentiating injured and uninjured parties at a later stage.257 The
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s class certification concluding that,
“so long as it is established that such a [administratively feasible] mecha-
nism can be identified, the presence of a de minimis number of uninjured
members at the class certification stage does not defeat a class action.”258
251. See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic of Arg., 806 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 2015) (denying class certifi-
cation because bond interest history was not administratively feasible to ascertain the class); see
also EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 359 (4th Cir. 2014) (denying class certification
because title documents were not administratively feasible to ascertain the class); see also Carrera
v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2013) (denying class certification because affidavits
were not administratively feasible to ascertain a class).
252. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 332 (1st Cir. 2015).
253. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2015).
254. See e.g., Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 WL 580696,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (“For example, in some cases, retailer or banking records may
make it economically and administratively feasible to determine who is in (and who is out) of a
putative class. Moreover, even though there is no requirement that a named plaintiff identify all
class members at the time of certification, that does not mean that a named plaintiff need not
present some method of identifying absent class members to prevail on a motion for class certifi-
cation.”); see also Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28,
2015) (“The Byrds’ proposed method to ascertain ‘household members’ is neither administratively
infeasible nor a violation of Defendants’ due process rights. Because the location of household
members is already known (a shared address with one of the 895 owners and lessees identified by
the Byrds), there are unlikely to be ‘serious administrative burdens that are incongruous with the
efficiencies expected in a class action.’” (citations omitted)).
255. In re Nexium, 777 F.3d at 9.
256. Id. at 14 (“All persons or entities in the United States and its territories who purchased or
paid for some or all of the purchase price for Nexium or its AB-rated generic equivalents . . . in
capsule form, for consumption by themselves, their families, or their members, employees, in-
sureds, participants or beneficiaries, during the period April 14, 2008[,] through and until the
anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ unlawful conduct cease.” (quoting In re Nexium (Es-
omeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. 168, 182 (D. Mass. 2013), aff’d sub nom. In re Nexium,
777 F.3d at 9).
257. Id. at 18.
258. Id. at 32 (emphasis in original). The trial court accepted the plaintiff’s mechanism of an
expert conducting “a classwide overcharge analysis to show common proof of damages” to ascer-
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The First Circuit’s opinion is consistent with its older rulings that required
an administratively feasible mechanism for ascertaining a class.259
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit did not grant the plaintiff’s proposed
class, but gave suggestions as to how the plaintiff could ascertain its class in
an administratively feasible manner.260 In Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of class certifi-
cation.261 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s assessment
of the plaintiff’s proposed method of identifying class members through the
defendant’s sales data as “incomplete, insofar as [plaintiff] did not explain
how the data would aid class-member identification.”262
At the district court, the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider and ex-
plained a detailed process to identify class members. But the district court
denied the plaintiff’s motion because he should have presented this method
when he originally filed for certification.263 The Eleventh Circuit explained
that the plaintiff’s fears of consumer class actions being “eradicated” be-
cause of the heightened ascertainability standard was unfounded.264 The
court explained that the plaintiff had previously succeeded in identifying
administratively feasible methods—and likely would have succeeded had
he explained initially how to use sales data to ascertain the class.265
2. Unfairness to Absent Class Members
Courts advocating for the lower ascertainability standard ignore the
policy concern of unfairness to absent class members because they think
that the heightened standard sets too high a bar for plaintiffs during class
certification.266 The Seventh Circuit justifiably believes that asking the
plaintiff to produce records identifying each member at the class certifica-
tion stage is too high a bar.267 But the Seventh Circuit misconstrued the
tain the class. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 297 F.R.D. 168, 182 (D. Mass. 2013),
aff’d sub nom. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
259. See, e.g., Crosby v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (“A class whose
“members [are] impossible to identify prior to individualized fact-finding and litigation . . . fails to
satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action”).
260. Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949–950 (11th Cir. 2015).
261. Id. at 950.
262. Id. at 949.
263. Id. (“Karhu did not explain to the court that it envisioned a three-step identification
process: (1) use the sales data to identify third-party retailers, (2) subpoena the retailers for their
records, and (3) use those records to identify class members. Therefore, the district court acted
within its discretion when it rejected Karhu’s proposal to identify class members via VPX’s ‘sales
data.’” (emphasis in original)).
264. Id. at 950.
265. Id.
266. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The heightened as-
certainability approach upsets this balance. It comes close to insisting on actual notice to protect
the interests of absent class members, yet overlooks the reality that without certification, putative
class members with valid claims would not recover anything at all.”).
267. Id.
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heightened standard. The standard only requires a plaintiff to show what
records it may use to identify class members.268 For example, in Byrd, the
Third Circuit granted certification to a class where the plaintiff did not pro-
duce records identifying each class member but presented evidence that
class members could be identified through public records.269 Thus, “there is
no records requirement”270 at the ascertainability stage—the requirement
the Seventh Circuit feared would destroy low value class action suits.
The Seventh Circuit thought that actual notice to each of the hundreds,
or possible thousands, of class members was too high a bar.271 But again,
the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the heightened standard. The Third Cir-
cuit was not discussing whether each individual class member would be
given actual notice, but rather, whether a class member could identify
whether she was a part of the class from the notice.272 Under the lower
standard, a class member may not be able to determine whether she is part
of the suit and yet be barred from bringing future action against the
defendant.273
By requiring a plaintiff to identify (but not produce) documents to as-
certain the proposed class, the heightened standard carries out the best prac-
ticable notice standard required by Rule 23.274 Knowing a plaintiff’s
identification method ensures that a class member can look at a notice and
determine whether she is indeed part of a class action suit.275 The height-
ened standard of ascertainability should be applied because it best protects
absent class members’ interests.
268. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 169–170 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 2015)
(“We were careful to specify in Carrera that ‘[a]lthough some evidence used to satisfy as-
certainability, such as corporate records, will actually identify class members at the certification
stage, ascertainability only requires the plaintiff to show that class members can be identified.’ . . .
Carrera stands for the proposition that a party cannot merely provide assurances to the district
court that it will later meet Rule 23’s requirements.” (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d
300, 306–307, 311 (3d Cir. 2013))).
269. Id. at 169 (“The Byrds’ proposed classes consisting of ‘owners’ and ‘lessees’ are ascer-
tainable. There are ‘objective records’ that can ‘readily identify’ these class members . . . .”).
270. Id. at 164.
271. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (“Courts also have asserted that the heightened ascertainability
requirement is needed to protect absent class members. If the identities of absent class members
cannot be ascertained, the argument goes, it is unfair to bind them by the judicial proceeding. A
central premise of this argument is that class members must receive actual notice of the class
action so that they do not lose their opt-out rights. We believe that premise is mistaken.” (citing
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307; Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir.2012)).
272. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 (“[A]scertainability only requires the plaintiff to show that class
members can be identified.”) (emphasis added).
273. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 666 (“We did not insist on first-class mail even though the
notice plan likely would not reach everyone in the class. We approved the plan because the notice
plan was ‘commensurate with the stakes.’”).
274. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305–06 (“[The heightened standard] protects absent class mem-
bers by facilitating the best notice practicable under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 23(b)(3) action.”); see
also id. at 307 (“[A]t the commencement of a class action, ascertainability and a clear class defini-
tion allow potential class members to identify themselves for purposes of opting out of a class.”).
275. Id. at 307.
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3. Unfairness to Bona Fide Class Members
Courts applying the lower standard also ignore the concern of unfair-
ness to bona fide class members because they think that fraudulent claims
do not affect the recovery of a bona fide class member.276 The Seventh
Circuit’s perception of a miniscule—and largely insignificant—risk of
fraudulent claims is certainly true for some class actions.277 For example, in
Mullins, the class was asking the defendant to refund each defective product
sold because the class was pursuing a consumer fraud claim.278 Mullins was
an uncapped settlement—the amount the defendant paid was determined by
the number of refunds.279 Thus, fraudulent claims would not significantly
affect the recovery of a bona fide class member.280
Conversely, in some class actions, fraudulent claims can have an im-
mense effect on the recovery of a bona fide class member. The class action
suit Careathers brought against Red Bull effectively proves this.281 The
plaintiff sought class certification for a group of consumers allegedly in-
jured by Red Bull’s deceptive advertising phrase, “Red Bull Gives You
Wings.”282 The parties agreed to a settlement where each class member
who purchased Red Bull between January 1, 2002 and October 3, 2014
would receive an estimated $10 check or $15 voucher for Red Bull Prod-
ucts.283 Red Bull capped its payout at $13 million;284 the more claims that
were filed, the less money each class member would receive. The parties
created a website to allow class members to file affidavits to create a
claim.285 Instead of the estimated 1.3 million claimants, over two million
people filed claims—causing the site to crash within hours.286 The recovery
per class member quickly dwindled to four dollars or a four pack of Red
Bull energy drinks.287 Class members received less than half of their esti-
mated recovery—showing that fraudulent claims can affect bona fide class
members’ recovery.288 Although capped settlements are becoming increas-
276. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n practice, the risk of dilution based on
fraudulent or mistaken claims seems low, perhaps to the point of being negligible.”).
277. Id. (“In this case, for example, the value of each claim is approximately $70 (the retail
price). Direct Digital has provided no evidence, and we have found none, that claims of this
magnitude have provoked the widespread submission of inaccurate or fraudulent claims.”).
278. Id. at 657.
279. Id. at 670–71
280. Id. at 667.
281. Onika Williams, Red Bull Class Settlement Flies Despite Dilution of Class Recovery,
AM. B. ASS’N (Sept. 18, 2015), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/
091815-class-recovery-payout-cap.html.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Williams, supra note 281.
288. Id.
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ingly popular in consumer class action suits, the Second Circuit failed to
consider their effect.289
This same case would likely have come out drastically different under
the heightened ascertainability standard. The heightened standard does not
rule out affidavits altogether, instead it requires some type of screening pro-
cess to weed out fraudulent claims.290 The parties could have used such a
screening process to only pay legitimate class members who had an in-
jury—rather than a fraudulent class member who read about the suit on
Buzzfeed and proceeded to file a false affidavit.291 The heightened ap-
proach simply pushes up the Seventh Circuit’s auditing proposals to the
ascertainability stage so that there is a plan in place if a situation similar to
Red Bull actually materializes.292 The heightened standard protects bona
fide class members by ensuring they receive the recovery they are entitled
to.293
4. Protecting Defendants’ Due Process Rights
Finally, by incorrectly shifting the burden to defendants on self-serv-
ing affidavits, the lower ascertainability standard cavalierly addresses de-
fendants’ due process rights. The Seventh Circuit correctly identified that,
like summary judgment motions, affidavits are allowed in many court pro-
ceedings. But the court omits an important point.294 Conclusory and self-
serving affidavits—like the affidavits used in low-value consumer class ac-
tions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment without
support on the record.295 By allowing a plaintiff to propose a class and
289. See, e.g., id.
290. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will afford Carrera
the opportunity to submit a screening model specific to this case and prove how the model will be
reliable and how it would allow Bayer to challenge the affidavits.”); see also Karhu v. Vital
Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff proposing ascertainment via
self-identification, then, must establish how the self-identification method proposed will avoid the
potential problems just described.”).
291. Jacob Davidson, Thanks for Ruining the Red Bull Settlement, Internet, TIME (Oct. 9
2014), http://time.com/money/3484564/red-bull-settlement-ruined/ (“Buzzfeed’s post alone [was]
viewed more than 4.6 million times . . . .”).
292. See, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310–311.
293. Id. at 310.
294. Mullins v. Direct Digital, 795 F.3d 654, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If not disputed, self-serv-
ing affidavits can support a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, for example, and defend-
ants surely will be entitled to a fair opportunity to challenge self-serving affidavits from plaintiffs.
We are aware of only one type of case in American law where the testimony of one witness is
legally insufficient to prove a fact. See U.S. Const., Art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (‘No person shall be con-
victed of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession
in open court.’). There is no good reason to extend that rule to consumer class actions.”).
295. Jeffrey L. Freeman, Propriety, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of
granting summary judgment when deponent contradicts in affidavit earlier admission of fact in
deposition, 131 A.L.R. FED. 403, at § 3  (1996) (“Conclusory allegations and self-serving affida-
vits, without support in the record, do not create a triable issue of fact, sufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment, and therefore, a party cannot avoid summary judgment through
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prevail on hearsay affidavits, the Seventh Circuit wrongly shifts the burden
to the defendant to prove “say so” on the claims.296
The lower ascertainability standard also goes against the very purpose
of Rule 23—to efficiently adjudicate multiple claims in one suit.297 The
Seventh Circuit asserts that a defendant’s due process rights are protected as
long as a defendant has the chance to challenge any self-serving affida-
vits.298 The court’s label of a “‘lunatic or fanatic’”299 for someone who
would file an individual consumer claim, likely also fits any defendant who
tries to investigate hundreds, or potentially thousands, of individual affida-
vits. Even if a defendant had the resources and time to protect the due pro-
cess rights she or he has under the Seventh Circuit’s view,300 such a process
goes against the very purpose of the class action device—saving judicial
resources.301 The Seventh Circuit failed to consider the time and expense a
defendant expends exercising its due process rights.
The lower ascertainability standard potentially leaves a defendant open
to subsequent litigation on the same issues by some of the same class mem-
bers.302 The Seventh Circuit, and other courts applying the lower as-
certainability standard, failed to address this due process concern. Plaintiffs
can, and indeed have, tried to escape a class judgment by claiming inade-
quate representation.303 This opens up yet another can of worms as the Su-
preme Court has not addressed how much preclusive effect a court should
give to a prior court’s findings on adequacy of class representation.304 Thus,
a plaintiff could potentially claim inadequate class representation because
introduction of self-serving affidavits that contradict prior sworn testimony.” (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 56; Mav of Michigan, Inc. v. Am. Country Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2003))).
296. See Mullins,795 F.3d at 669.
297. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (explaining how class actions
save “the resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting
every [class member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.” (quoting Califano
v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979))).
298. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 669 (“It does not follow that a defendant has a due process right to a
cost-effective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership.”) (emphasis
in original)).
299. Id. at 665 (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.2004)).
300. Id. at 669 (“It is certainly true that a defendant has a due process right not to pay in
excess of its liability and to present individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability.”).
301. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 155 (explaining how class actions save “the resources of both the
courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be
litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.” (quoting Califano, 442 U.S. at 701)).
302. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013)
303. See, e.g., Wolfert ex rel. Estate of Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d
165, 170 (2d Cir. 2006).
304. See William B. Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons from Habeas, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 794 (2007) (“Class action scholars and lawyers had hoped that Stephenson
would settle the question of whether adequate representation findings could be relitigated collater-
ally, but it did not. With Justice Stevens recusing himself, the Court split 4-4 and thus simply
affirmed the Second Circuit’s outcome (permitting Stephenson’s case to go forward) without ren-
dering a decision of its own.”).
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of the fraudulent claims that significantly reduced the plaintiff’s recovery—
and open a defendant up to litigation on the same issues.
The heightened standard of ascertainability is justified by the concern
of protecting defendants’ due process rights—defendants have a right to be
protected from improper litigation on the same issues, and being forced to
improperly defend against “say so” affidavits.305 Protecting a defendants’
due process rights also helps uphold the judicial efficiency justification be-
hind adopting Rule 23.
VI. LAST DAY OF SCHOOL: WHAT’S THE VERDICT ON
ASCERTAINABILITY?
There is a deepening split on the standard for class ascertainability.
One side argues for a heightened standard at certification, while the other
side fears that such a standard will eliminate consumer class actions. But,
when one looks at the policy considerations on ascertainability, the height-
ened standard preserves consumer class actions and allows them to thrive,
as long the plaintiff identifies an administratively feasible mechanism to
ascertain its class. All the while, the heightened standard also promotes ju-
dicial efficiency, increases fairness to absent and bona fide class members,
and protects defendants’ due process rights. The Supreme Court should
adopt the heightened standard of ascertainability to address these policy
considerations and to ensure that class certification is adjudicated consist-
ently across federal courts.
305. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 304–306 (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
594 (3d Cir.2012)).
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